Andoni Iraola’s Liverpool entered this Northwest Derby with a clear intent to overwhelm Manchester United through high-intensity verticality and numerical advantages in the half-spaces. Tactically, Iraola sought to exploit United’s lack of defensive cohesion by utilizing Wirtz as a roaming playmaker, tasked with drifting between the lines to pull United’s centre-backs out of position. The strategy was built on pinning the visitors back early, using the width of Bradley Barcola and Ngumoha to stretch the pitch and create central passing lanes for Dominik Szoboszlai to exploit.
In contrast, Pochettino’s debut was framed by a desire for structural defensive stability and quick transitional bursts. He deployed a 4-2-3-1 intended to compress the middle of the pitch, with Kobbie Mainoo and Youri Tielemans serving as a double pivot to shield the back four. However, this plan was rendered obsolete within eight minutes following Leny Yoro’s dismissal. The tactical objective shifted instantly from balanced progression to a low-block damage-limitation exercise, a transition United failed to navigate as Liverpool’s fluid rotations proved too sophisticated for a depleted defensive unit.
Liverpool's tactical setup
Liverpool lined up in a highly flexible 4-2-3-1 formation that frequently morphed into a 3-2-5 during the build-up phase. With Jeremy Jacquet and Virgil van Dijk providing a high defensive line, the full-backs were encouraged to push high, allowing Barcola and Ngumoha to tuck inside and operate as inverted threats. The primary pressing trigger was any backward pass to United’s goalkeeper Senne Lammens or a heavy touch from Lisandro Martínez; Liverpool would immediately transition into a man-oriented press to force long, inaccurate clearances.
The standout feature of Iraola’s side was the interchangeability of the front four. Alexander Isak’s willingness to drop deep drew defenders away, creating the space for Szoboszlai to arrive late in the box. Wirtz acted as the tactical heartbeat, constantly finding pockets of space in the right half-space. Defensively, Liverpool maintained a compact 4-4-2 block when out of possession, but given they held 64% of the ball, their primary defensive work was counter-pressing. By winning the ball back quickly in the final third, they prevented United from finding Bruno Fernandes in transition. The fourth goal, scored by substitute Víctor Muñoz, epitomised this as Liverpool’s depth allowed them to maintain a high technical level, completing 509 accurate passes at an 88% success rate.
Man Utd's tactical setup
Pochettino’s Manchester United started with a 4-2-3-1 shape that aimed to be compact and resilient. The plan was to use Matheus Cunha’s physicality to hold the ball up and allow Bryan Mbeumo and Patrick Dorgu to exploit the space behind Liverpool's high-flying full-backs. However, the tactical blueprint was torn up in the 8th minute when Yoro was sent off for a professional foul on Isak. This forced an immediate retreat into a 4-4-1 defensive shape, which eventually became a 5-3-1 after Harry Maguire was introduced for Mbeumo in the 22nd minute.
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The lack of a secondary defensive anchor meant that United’s midfield was constantly bypassed. Mainoo and Tielemans were forced to cover too much horizontal ground, leaving the zone in front of the centre-backs vacant for Wirtz and Szoboszlai. United’s build-up was non-existent, often resorting to long balls that Alisson Becker easily intercepted. While Fernandes attempted to spark life into the attack - registering three shots on target - the lack of support meant United finished with an xG of just 0.63. The defensive shape lacked the lateral speed to track Liverpool’s wingers, and the disconnect between the midfield and the emergency back five allowed Liverpool to create seven big chances throughout the 90 minutes.
The tactical chess match
The definitive tactical battle occurred in the wide areas, where Liverpool’s wingers consistently won 1v1 duels against United’s full-backs. Ngumoha, in particular, was a constant thorn in Diogo Dalot’s side. His ability to hold the width before drifting inside created a dilemma for United: stay tight and leave space behind, or drop off and allow him to dictate play. Ngumoha’s assist for Wirtz’s goal in the 13th minute was a direct result of this mismatch.
Iraola clearly won the tactical duel by instructing his team to never let the tempo drop. Even when United consolidated into a deeper block, Liverpool used quick switches of play to shift the United defensive line until gaps appeared. Pochettino tried to mitigate this by introducing Joshua Zirkzee at half-time to provide a more stationary target for clearances, but without the numbers in midfield to win second balls, United remained under a perpetual siege. The gulf in tactical execution was reflected in the shots count, with Liverpool’s 11 shots on goal dwarfing United’s sporadic efforts.
In-game adjustments
The most significant adjustment came from Pochettino in the 22nd minute, moving to a back five by bringing on Maguire. While this briefly stemmed the bleeding centrally, it surrendered the flanks entirely. This was exploited by Barcola, who eventually teed up Ngumoha for the third goal. At half-time, Pochettino removed Cunha for Zirkzee, hoping for a focal point, but the lack of service rendered the change ineffective.
Iraola’s adjustments were more proactive. In the 72nd minute, he introduced Trey Nyoni and Víctor Muñoz to refresh the press. Muñoz’s introduction was particularly impactful; his fresh legs allowed Liverpool to maintain their verticality late in the game. His 82nd-minute goal was the product of a slick combination with Wirtz, showing that Iraola’s system remained functional regardless of the personnel. Liverpool also adjusted their pressing line in the second half, dropping slightly deeper to invite United out, only to catch them on devastating fast breaks. This allowed Liverpool to manage their energy while still accumulating a massive 4.38 xG by the final whistle.
Conclusion
Ultimately, the match was decided by Liverpool’s superior spatial awareness and the early red card that shattered United’s structure. Iraola’s insistence on keeping the pitch wide and utilizing Wirtz as a free-roaming disruptor prevented United from ever establishing a defensive rhythm. Pochettino’s attempts to park the bus with a back five failed because his midfield could not stop the supply line. Liverpool’s ability to sustain pressure and exploit numerical advantages in the final third turned a rivalry match into a tactical procession, leaving United 19th in the table and Pochettino with a mountain to climb.

