A blow that exposed the gaps: will Arteta pay the price for his new gamble?

Last season, Arsenal leaned on Martin Zubimendi as the holding midfielder while Declan Rice played the box-to-box role, using his ability to carry the ball forward, join the press and win possession back.

The side lost some of its momentum as the season wound down. Then Myles Lewis-Skelly came into the deep-lying role and gave the system a fresh jolt, restoring its vitality and clearing a few obstacles. Arteta has trusted the youngster there ever since, and the role has become one of the cornerstones of Arsenal's new approach.

With the ball, the team builds from a shape best described as a 3-1-6. Rice drops into the back line to form a defensive three alongside Ezri Konsa and Gabriel Magalhães, leaving Lewis-Skelly as the sole anchor in midfield, the link between defence and attack.

That setup hands Arsenal several ways to play out from the back. It also loads huge responsibility onto the players, above all the anchor man, who must read opponents' movements and pick the right moment to receive and release the ball.

Nor do the roles stay fixed. Riccardo Calafiori, Ben White and Martin Ødegaard rotate positions, with some of them dropping deeper so that a build-up base of five players forms in certain phases.

Those movements let Arsenal flick between two shapes, a 3-2 or a 4-1, depending on how the opponent presses and which players are free to receive. The idea is simple: create overloads in the right areas, offer more than one passing option, then carry the ball forward into the opponent's territory rather than lumping it long or relying on individual moments.

Deploying Rice in the backline hands Arsenal a crucial edge. The England international handles the ball superbly under pressure, whether that means picking out a precise pass or driving into open space.

Konsa builds play well enough in the absence of William Saliba, but Rice brings a different set of qualities to the position. He thrives with the whole pitch in front of him, reading his teammates' movements and spotting passing lanes with time and space to spare.

Contrast that with the midfielder's usual lot, receiving the ball with his back to goal. That situation can blunt some of Rice's strengths, despite his physical power and prowess in duels.

Dropping into the backline lets him exploit his vision and his ball-carrying, while Lewis-Skelly takes charge of linking the lines. The division of labour is designed to give Arsenal more control and flexibility.

Success hinges on timing. Any delay on the ball or a slip in positioning can turn Arsenal's numerical advantage into a weakness for the opponent to pounce on.

Lewis-Skelly did not land his place in the new system by chance. He earned it through a set of qualities that make him a natural fit as the holding player in tight spaces.

Composed under pressure, the youngster keeps the ball and beats opponents in one-on-one duels. He will take a risk when the game demands it too, whether that means dribbling out of trouble or firing a direct ball into the forwards.

Why do these attributes matter? The holding player cannot simply collect the ball and roll it to the nearest teammate. He has to break the lines of pressure and open the routes that spring the team from defence into attack.

His performances in the role caught the eye of England manager Thomas Tuchel, who used the international break to borrow some of Arteta's ideas for the player.

Elliot Anderson, meanwhile, was handed a role similar to Rice's within a back three, an attempt to tap into the advantages this tactical setup offers.

That interest proves the point. The job Lewis-Skelly does is more than occupying a new position. It is part of a tactical idea that can be put to use at different levels.

Arsenal's biggest problem against Brighton was the absence of Lewis-Skelly from the holding midfield role, with Bruno Guimaraes stepping into his place.

That change hurt the team's ability to cope with pressure. The role demands plenty, and Brighton thrived on high intensity in everything they did, whether in possession or chasing the ball back.

To play out of tight areas, Arsenal's players needed precise technique, ideal positioning and quick timing in their movements, plus a constant awareness of where their team-mates were.

Guimaraes was always going to need time to adapt to the demands of the role. Handing him the job against a side that presses man-to-man so efficiently placed him before a difficult test, especially as Lewis-Skelly had built up greater experience in the position within Arteta's system.

The problem went beyond who filled the role. It extended to Arsenal's ability to make the right decisions under pressure, and Brighton's approach left the London side hesitating, forced into passes they weren't ready for.

Arteta said after the match that the problem showed from the very first throw-in. His team put itself in difficult situations several times, he explained, before stressing the need to play out more quickly. He called it one of the most important lessons from the game.

During the match, Arsenal gave the ball away repeatedly through inaccurate passes, despite their reputation for winning one-on-one duels. Brighton, in turn, tightened the press on the ball carrier, squeezed the space around him and forced Arteta's players into rushed decisions.

Nor did Brighton press non-stop. They dealt with the match intelligently, at times dropping into deeper areas before pouncing on Arsenal's players the moment they spotted an opening.

Arsenal may have expected the usual scenario: dominating the ball in the attacking third against a compact defence, breaking it down with short passes and interchanging movements.

Brighton refused to oblige. They relied on a defensive structure that let them switch quickly into man-to-man pressing, with each player tasked to mark an opponent and cut off his passing options.

Hurzeler, in doing so, denied Arsenal the chance to find a free man to build attacks through, and forced them to hunt for alternative solutions that weren't easily available.

Having imposed an unfamiliar style on their opponent, Brighton stopped Arsenal creating the conditions they prefer for playing out or controlling the rhythm.

That is the danger of man-to-man pressing done well. It does not merely reduce space. It hands every player the responsibility of a quick decision under direct pressure, and tests the team's ability to move as one to break free of the marking.

For Arsenal, beating this type of pressing takes more than sharper passing. The team needs anticipatory movement, a constant rotation of positions and the boldness to go past opponents rather than settle for the safe ball.

Harsh as the defeat was, Arteta's record shows he can handle tactical challenges and learn from difficult matches.

Arsenal faced a similar test last season in the League Cup final, when Manchester City turned to a different defensive setup. City lined up in a 4-2-4 shape, leaning on zonal marking and shutting down the routes to goal through the middle.

The approach let Arsenal's defenders keep the ball in certain areas, but it choked their ability to push forward and create through the centre. Breaking down that system became a complex task.

Enzo Maresca went back to the same idea against Arsenal in this season's Community Shield, trusting the method that had worked so well against the London side.

This time the outcome was different. Arsenal came into the game better prepared and armed with multiple solutions to the defensive organisation, drawing on their players' technical quality and the variety of their roles during the build-up.

That experience shows Arteta can tweak his ideas when his players get enough time to grasp the changes and work on them in training. It gives him grounds for optimism about fixing the problems that surfaced against Brighton.

Organised individual pressing remains a tougher nut to crack. It demands the ability to make decisions under direct pressure, along with synchronised collective movement to exploit any lapse in marking.

Arteta's changes don't stop at building from the back. They extend to how the players move in the final third, especially on the right, where Arsenal now rely on a more flexible shape that is less symmetrical between the two flanks.

Kai Havertz sometimes drifts towards the right touchline these days, while Ben White pushes up from full-back into more advanced areas, and Bukayo Saka switches between hugging the wing and coming inside into central areas.

Rice and Odegaard move into the right spaces to receive the ball and join the attacks, handing the team varied options and complicating the opponent's job of defining who marks whom. The aim is to create a numerical advantage in tight spaces, exchange short passes, drag defenders out of position, then exploit the gaps those movements open up.

Against teams that sit in a low block, this idea takes on particular importance. That was one of the challenges Arsenal struggled with in past seasons. Rather than settling for passing around the box, the team looks to drag the opponent towards one side, then shift the ball into the empty central areas or the opposite flank.

These movements have borne fruit in chances and goals this season, and given Arteta extra ways to unpick opposition defences. But attacking flexibility brings greater defensive responsibility in return. The players have to keep their balance when they lose the ball and avoid leaving wide spaces open to counterattacks.

How Arteta responds to Brighton will be a defining moment for his project. He must work out whether the problem lies in poor execution of the new ideas, or whether he needs to rethink the distribution of roles and the way his side handles pressure.

The fix may start with quicker passing and sharper movement off the ball. Give the man in possession more options and he won't be forced to cling to it or rush a decision.

Shifting the positioning of midfielders and defenders could open up better passing angles too, making it harder for opponents to man-mark every available option.

None of this means scrapping the new shape. What it needs is development, a system flexible enough to adapt to different opponents. What works against a team built on defensive compactness may fall flat against one that presses hard all over the pitch.

Ultimately, the Brighton defeat looks like an early warning for Arteta rather than a final verdict on his project. A side used to competing for titles cannot simply recycle the methods that gave it an edge in past seasons, not when rivals are constantly hunting for weaknesses and closing the gap.

Change carries clear risks and may bring the odd stumble during the adaptation phase. Yet it remains essential for any team wanting to stay at the top. Caught between correcting mistakes and backing his new ideas, Arteta will try to turn the Brighton shock into a chance to rebuild Arsenal in a more varied, flexible way.

The question is no longer just whether Arsenal can impose their usual style. It's whether they can find another way when an opponent succeeds in disrupting their plans. The answer may shape the next chapter of Arteta's project and reveal whether his new adventure takes the team higher, or forces a rethink before it's too late.