USMNT need more than Mauricio Pochettino or a big-name coach: Five ways U.S. Soccer must change after World Cup exit

Sometimes it's as simple as talent. Want to know the silver bullet for getting better at soccer? Get better players. You can invest all you want, put money in the right places, and figure everything out with the infrastructure. But at the end of the day, if the 26 guys in your squad are good at soccer, you'll be competitive.

It's how pretty much every smaller soccer nation has improved of late. From Curaçao to Morocco, leveraging dual nationals and reaching out to diaspora populations have raised the level. You only have to look at some of the U.S.'s best players for evidence. Folarin Balogun, Antonee Robinson, Sergino Dest, Gio Reyna, Ricardo Pepi and Malik Tillman were all brought into the fold thanks to eager recruiting from the U.S. Soccer hierarchy. Noahkai Banks is still raw, but there are signs to suggest that he can be next. The U.S. have to keep pushing the envelope there. It's how you raise the floor, and quickly.

This is perhaps a slower-burn solution, but it matters. Swinging big on a high-profile foreign coach can work in the short term, and Pochettino did make the USMNT better in several ways. He also found value in emerging players such as Alex Freeman, showing that he was willing to look deeper into the domestic pool. But if the goal is to build something over multiple cycles, knowledge of the American soccer ecosystem cannot be treated as a bonus. It has to be part of the job description.

That was one of the complications with Jurgen Klinsmann, too. He had his successes, but he was often openly skeptical of MLS and the domestic player pathway. That matters because the next step for the USMNT will not come only from recruiting dual nationals or waiting for another Christian Pulisic-level star to emerge. It will also come from better identifying, developing, and trusting the players already coming through the system.

Expensive short-term investments do not usually reshape a player pool. Long-term alignment does. Spain promoted Luis de la Fuente after years with the country's youth national teams. Lionel Scaloni came from within Argentina's setup. Gareth Southgate came through England's youth system. Didier Deschamps was not a federation lifer, but he knew the French game inside and out before taking over the national team. The common thread is not glamour. It is continuity.

Pochettino could still stay, and there is a case for that if he is committed to the full cycle. But if U.S. Soccer does move on, it should think carefully about what kind of coach this job requires. The next hire does not need to be the biggest name available. It needs to be someone who understands the players, the pathway and the country he is being asked to lead. B.J. Callaghan, your phone should be ringing soon.

A strong domestic league does not guarantee a strong national team. Argentina are the clearest example. Their best players are spread across Europe, and their domestic league has long operated as a selling league. Morocco, Switzerland and Norway have also shown that World Cup success does not require a top-five domestic league.

But the U.S. faces a different challenge. The issue is not just whether MLS can produce more players. It already is producing more of them, and the league’s academies have become a major part of the American player pathway. The bigger question is how many talented kids are still being missed before they ever get close to that pathway.

That is where U.S. Soccer and MLS can make a real difference. The pay-to-play model remains one of the biggest structural barriers in the American game. Too many families are priced out by club fees, travel costs, showcases, equipment and private training before their children are ever seriously scouted. In a country this big and diverse, that is not just a participation problem. It is a talent-identification problem.

The next step should be a serious joint effort to lower those barriers: more subsidized elite environments, more free regional centers, more support for travel and equipment, and better scouting in communities that are not already connected to the academy system. MLS does not need to become Europe, and U.S. Soccer does not need to run every local club. But the two sides should be aligned on one obvious goal: making sure talent, not family income, determines who gets seen.

The USMNT do not need every domestic prospect to become Christian Pulisic. They need a deeper, wider, and more representative player pool. That starts long before players reach the national team. It starts by making the game more accessible to the kids who are still being left out.

American supporters showed up during the World Cup. The passion is clearly there. The harder question is how U.S. Soccer keeps that energy alive when the stakes are lower.

That was an issue throughout the previous cycle. Mauricio Pochettino and several U.S. players spoke at times about wanting better atmospheres at friendlies and tournaments such as the Gold Cup. If the federation wants to build on the engagement of this summer, it has to make those games easier to attend. That starts with money.

Friendlies should not be expensive. The USMNT’s friendly against Ecuador in October had a get-in price of $84 before fees, with some tickets rising to around $300. Yes, people need to make money. Yes, there are spreadsheets that need sorting out here. But it should not be that expensive to buy one ticket to a friendly where teams are often playing at half speed.

Want fans to fall in love with a team? Make it easier for them to show up. In fairness, U.S. Soccer has made some strides in that regard. American Outlaws members were able to purchase tickets for $45 apiece for the pre-World Cup friendlies, with an agreement for inexpensive, fixed-price tickets that lasts through October. That is a start. But U.S. Soccer could go further by borrowing from MLS clubs that use discounted entry-level tickets, community offers or first-time fan promotions to bring new supporters into the building.

That is exactly the kind of initiative this country needs. The more affordable the games are, the easier it is to turn World Cup curiosity into actual USMNT support.

The U.S. played just one exhibition outside the country during Pochettino’s time as manager: a 2-0 loss to Mexico in Guadalajara in October 2024. For a team that did not have to navigate World Cup qualifying because of its status as co-host, that matters.

There is only so much pressure that can be created in domestic friendlies. Playing at home has value, especially when U.S. Soccer is trying to build a stronger connection with fans, but the USMNT also needed more uncomfortable environments before the World Cup. They needed more games where the crowd was against them, where travel was part of the challenge and where mistakes were punished by something closer to a tournament-level atmosphere.

By comparison, the USMNT played seven friendlies outside the country under Gregg Berhalter, 21 under Jurgen Klinsmann and 11 under Bob Bradley. Those teams also exited in the Round of 16, so road friendlies are not some magic solution. But this group was supposed to be different. It was arguably the most talented squad in program history, and yet when Belgium raised the pressure, the U.S. unraveled.

More road tests would not have guaranteed a different World Cup outcome. They would, however, have given the USMNT more chances to confront the kind of adversity that eventually ended its tournament. For the next cycle, U.S. Soccer should not just schedule friendlies that are convenient or commercially attractive. It should schedule games that make the team uncomfortable.