Football rarely follows a straight line. Sometimes marginal gains turn into titles, and sometimes clear improvements lead to worse outcomes.
Liverpool’s last two seasons capture that contradiction.
After the departure of Jürgen Klopp, a figure who defined an era, the club turned to Arne Slot. It was not an obvious appointment. Outside of those closely following the Eredivisie or European secondary competitions, his profile remained relatively unknown. Expectations were cautious, especially with a limited summer window that only brought in Federico Chiesa on a low-cost deal, and even he played a minimal role.
What followed was unexpected.
Slot reshaped the team’s structure. A double pivot allowed Ryan Gravenberch to revive his career, while Alexis Mac Allister and Dominik Szoboszlai provided balance and control. The chaos that had defined the final phase of Klopp’s tenure was reduced. Liverpool became more stable, more measured, and ultimately won the Premier League.
Some attributed that title to external factors such as Manchester City’s drop-off or Arsenal’s injuries. But Liverpool’s internal improvements, particularly in workload management and game control, made the success deserved.
Then came the shift.
Liverpool invested heavily: Florian Wirtz, Alexander Isak, Hugo Ekitiké, and Milos Kerkez arrived. High-end attacking profiles, but not necessarily complementary ones. At the same time, they lost unique pieces: Trent Alexander-Arnold, a system-defining creator, alongside the departures of Darwin Núñez and Luis Díaz, two profiles that offered verticality, chaos, and direct threat. The result was not just personnel change, but a structural shift in how Liverpool attack and occupy space.
The team did not just evolve. It transformed.
And with that transformation came a different kind of instability.
To understand what truly changed, we need to move beyond results and look at the fundamentals: the chances Liverpool create, and the chances they concede.
Liverpool vs The New Premier League
Before analysing Liverpool’s chance creation and concession, one contextual factor is essential.
The Premier League has shifted rapidly towards a more direct, man-oriented and set-piece-driven style. While the signs of this evolution were already visible, the speed and scale of the change this season have been significant. The league has become more focused on duels, second balls and verticality, reducing the value of sustained control.
Liverpool have struggled to adapt to this environment.
Their profile appears ill-suited to these demands. They lack consistent physical dominance in key moments, are not among the most innovative sides on set pieces, and their pressing structure is increasingly bypassed by direct play. Opponents are not engaging with Liverpool’s structure, they are going over it.
This pattern was particularly visible during their difficult run in October and November. In that stretch, their only win came against Aston Villa, a team more inclined to build short. Other opponents adopted a direct approach and consistently disrupted Liverpool’s control.
This is not an attempt to absolve responsibility. The club and coaching staff could have anticipated these trends and adjusted accordingly. However, Liverpool are not the only side affected, the league-wide shift has caught several teams off guard. In that context, Arne Slot’s background in a more positional and control-oriented football culture may have contributed to the delayed adaptation.
With that context established, we now turn to the pitch.
How did Liverpool actually perform, both offensively and defensively?
Offensively
Liverpool this season have lacked spark, pace in the final third, and a consistent killer instinct. Hugo Ekitiké has been the only attacker to truly meet expectations, despite not being the main headline signing. Much of the focus was on Florian Wirtz and Alexander Isak, yet neither has fully settled. One has struggled to express himself in his preferred zones without disrupting the team structure, while the other has dealt with injuries in an already unstable attacking setup.
At a collective level, Liverpool’s attacking unit has not fully adapted to the demands of the new league context, particularly in terms of physicality, defensive work, and constant positional adjustments.
With that in mind, we turn to their chance creation.
Dream DataballLiverpool’s Current Non Penalty Shots For Map of the 2025-26 Premier League Season
A few patterns stand out.
There is a relatively limited volume of high-quality chances. While Liverpool generate a large number of shots and the average shooting distance is favorable, the density of truly dangerous opportunities is not as high as expected. The shot distribution shows attempts coming from a variety of zones rather than consistently central, high-value areas.
There is also a visible reliance on crosses and set-play situations, which aligns with the broader shift in the league. At the same time, there are a number of more ambitious attempts from outside the box, which lowers the overall efficiency.
Overall, the attack remains functional and capable of sustaining a strong league position, but it lacks sharpness at the top end. The main limitation is not finishing, but the volume and consistency of high-quality chances.
Defensively
This is where Liverpool’s main issues become clear.
Dream DataballLiverpool’s Current Non Penalty Shots Against Map of the 2025-26 Premier League Season
Both volume and quality are major concerns. Liverpool concede too many shots from close, central areas, and the xG per shot against reflects the danger of these situations.
A key problem is transition defense. Around 40% of the chances they concede come from transitions, situations where possession is lost and the team is exposed. This is significantly higher than the share of transition chances they generate themselves, highlighting a clear imbalance.
There are also recurring patterns in how chances are conceded, particularly from wide areas and set plays, including corners from the right side. These issues match what has been observed in matches, where direct play and second balls repeatedly disrupt Liverpool’s structure.
Another important point is outcome versus expectation. Liverpool have conceded more goals than their xG against suggests. This could be partly due to variance or goalkeeping inconsistencies, including adaptation issues for Giorgi Mamardashvili, but the gap is large enough to indicate deeper defensive problems.
Overall, Liverpool’s struggles this season are most evident without the ball. The combination of structural weaknesses, transition vulnerability, and difficulty adapting to the league’s current style has made them far easier to play against.
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