Capital is tightening its grip on football, with private equity playing an ever bigger part. Takeovers at clubs such as A.C. Milan, Chelsea and Olympique Lyon show investment firms increasingly see the global game as an attractive growth market.
In the newsletter Cleats & Cashflows, we dig into that shift. We look at the strategic opportunities it creates, but also the risks that come with rising financial investment in football. This edition is the final chapter of our Milan mini-series, made up of four blogs.
Here, we focus on the Oaktree era. How does an investor specialising in distressed debt run one of Europe’s biggest football clubs? And how are Inter trying to move from debt-fuelled growth to a more financially sustainable model?
Once Oaktree took control of Inter, the first job was obvious: work out exactly what the fund had inherited. Suning’s eight-year era did not end with a negotiated sale or a planned handover. The club landed in Oaktree’s hands because Suning could no longer repay its debts and the creditor exercised its right to the club.
The ownership group had put more than €500 million of its own money and loans into the club. In the end, very little value was left for Suning. The group walked away with a heavily written-down stake in Inter, without being able to sell the investment in the normal way.
That meant the takeover followed a familiar pattern in distressed-company investing. An investor puts money into a business in financial trouble, often in return for a relatively high fee. If the company then fails to refinance its debts, the lender can eventually take control.
Despite the financial problems, Inter still appealed to Oaktree. The club have a globally recognised brand, a rich history, a huge following and remain competitively relevant. In that sense, it was a classic example of how an investment in a financially distressed company can end.
Across the city, there were clear parallels with what had happened earlier in Milan. Six years before, Elliott Management took control of AC Milan after Li Yonghong could no longer meet his financial obligations.
Still, there were important differences. Elliott chose a far more active approach. The fund injected fresh money into Milan and tried to rebuild the club financially and organisationally. Milan were eventually sold to RedBird in 2022.
By contrast, Oaktree appear to be taking a more patient line. The fund is focused less on a rapid rebuild and more on financial stability, refinancing the debts and preserving Inter’s value over the long term.
The comparison between the two ownership models will be explored in more detail in the final part of this mini-series. For Oaktree itself, the takeover marked a major shift. An investor that usually deals with companies and organisations with major financial problems had suddenly taken control of one of Europe’s biggest football clubs. The fund already had some football experience through French club SM Caen, which it took over in 2020. But Inter operate on a completely different scale.
Even so, the financial market reacted with striking calm. Inter’s €415 million of bonds stayed broadly stable in value in May and June 2024. The rating agencies also left the creditworthiness of those loans unchanged. That matters because it shows the financial markets saw little extra risk in the move to Oaktree.
So the credit market grasped faster than much of the football media that Oaktree’s takeover did not trigger a financial crisis and instead brought more stability. Uncertainty around the club’s financing eased, and a professional investor used to handling large debts and financial risk took charge.
The clearest sign of Oaktree’s stabilising effect arrived in 2025: Inter managed to refinance their debts at 4.52%, significantly cutting the annual interest burden.
Ultimately, the core idea behind the Suning model did not work. The ownership group believed sporting success would eventually bring enough commercial growth to carry the heavy debt burden. The trophies did come. The revenues did not grow quickly enough to cover the costs and debts that came with the model.
The financial turnaround
The financial impact of the move to Oaktree is clearest in the numbers for the 2024/25 financial year. They show a club finally making a profit again from day-to-day activities, while still carrying the financial legacy of the Suning era.
The income statement is starting to look healthy and sustainable. The balance sheet still needs more repair.
Income and expenditure
Inter posted record revenue in 2024/25 from their main activities of around €551 million, according to Swiss Ramble’s calculation. By the club’s own figures, revenue came to around €567 million.
That gap is mainly down to the way transfer income and other additional revenue are accounted for. Revenue rose by around €144 million compared with the previous year. That works out at growth of around 35%.
Broadcasting income made the biggest contribution. It climbed to around €265 million, an increase of about 50%. The long Champions League run and participation in the World Cup for clubs drove most of the extra income. According to the available figures, the World Cup for clubs segment generated around €31 million in one-off income.
At the same time, it shows how volatile that revenue stream can be. The amounts paid by UEFA depend heavily on sporting performance and participation in European competitions. That makes this income less predictable than, for example, commercial income or income from owning a stadium.
Matchday income broke through €100 million for the first time and reached around €104 million. According to Swiss Ramble’s calculation, that includes around €4 million in season-ticket income. The club’s annual accounts do not include that.
One game alone, the Champions League semi-final against Barcelona, is said to have generated around €14 million. That set a new Italian record for revenue from a single match. Commercial income also grew, reaching around €160 million. A stronger sponsorship base and greater international visibility drove that rise.
The shirt deal with Betsson, reportedly worth around €30 million a year, became the biggest shirt sponsorship agreement in the history of Italian football. At the same time, Inter extended their partnership with Nike until 2031. According to the available information, that deal guarantees a fixed annual fee of more than €20 million. With performance bonuses, the total value could rise towards €30 million a year over the coming seasons.
On the cost side, wage costs rose to around €253 million. That is about €26 million more than a year earlier. Bonuses paid to players and staff for the sporting success explain an important part of that increase. More importantly, revenues rose far faster than wage costs.
Inter also sharply reduced the costs they account for in relation to players. When a club buy a player, the transfer fee is not booked as a cost in one go. The amount is spread across the length of the contract. Those annual costs came to around €61 million, compared with €96 million a year earlier. Four years earlier, the figure was still around €137 million.
That also meant a big improvement in the ratio between squad costs and revenue. If wages and player costs are added together, total player costs come to around €314 million.
Set against UEFA-adjusted revenue, €551 million of core revenue plus an average of €36 million per year in transfer profits over three years, the ratio came to around 53.5%. That is comfortably below UEFA’s 70% limit.
Even in a less favourable scenario, with revenue falling back to around €500 million, the ratio would still be manageable at around 58.6%. That points to a far healthier cost model than in the peak years of the Suning era.
The final result perhaps tells the clearest story. Inter posted a net profit of around €35 million. More importantly, profit from normal operations came to around €69 million, even before transfer income.
That distinction matters. Under Suning, transfers often acted as a financial emergency fix. The club sold players to absorb structural losses from day-to-day operations.
Under Oaktree, profit increasingly seems to be coming from the football club itself rather than from selling valuable players. Transfers no longer have to absorb the losses. Day-to-day operations are starting to become sustainable on their own. One caveat remains: we still have only a small number of years to test that trend. Even so, the current figures point to a promising financial future for Inter.
Balance sheet
Despite the return to profit, Inter’s balance sheet still reflects the previous ownership era. Equity remained negative at around -€12 million. That was still a substantial improvement on around -€100 million a year earlier.
Part of that improvement came from the net profit, the conversion of owner loans into equity and around €52 million of new money that Oaktree put into the club.
Maurits LindersChart: development of Inter’s equity
Total debt tells a similar story, with the recovery moving forward step by step. The trend is clearly positive: total liabilities have fallen from their highest level. Even so, the absolute sums remain significant relative to Inter’s equity. That underlines how much debt piled up during the Suning era.
Maurits LindersChart: development of Inter’s total debt
In short, income and expenditure are recovering faster than the balance sheet. Inter are no longer making structural losses, but the legacy of years in which sporting success was largely financed with borrowed money has not yet fully disappeared.
Cash flows
Inter generated far more money from day-to-day operations in 2024/25. The club reported cash flow from day-to-day operations of around €107 million. That is almost certainly one of the strongest results in the club’s recent history.
Swiss Ramble put the figure at around €146 million. The difference comes from the way various costs are included. The lower figure includes, among other things, around €6 million in depreciation of other assets, €35 million in interest paid and around €10 million in taxes paid.
That gap matters. Before interest and tax were paid, the football club generated a lot of money. After paying interest and tax, much less was left.
Even so, the improvement is substantial. Higher income from UEFA, more matchday revenue, commercial growth and lower player costs finally meant day-to-day activities were generating serious money. Unlike in previous years, Inter no longer had to rely mainly on transfers or owner support to keep the model going.
Meanwhile, investment in infrastructure is rising. Inter are said to have plans to invest around €100 million in modernising the training complex and other key facilities.
That fits Oaktree’s focus on improving the club’s assets and creating long-term value. It marks a shift away from investing only in the squad and towards investments that strengthen the club as an organisation. The same thinking is central to the San Siro project, which will be discussed in the next part.
Even so, Inter spent about €46 million more cash overall than they brought in. Around €49 million of new capital from Oaktree largely covered that gap. That also highlights the remaining tension in the model: day-to-day operations have improved sharply, but the club’s financial position still needs support.
So the overall picture is nuanced. Inter are once again making a profit from day-to-day activities, generating significant cash, reducing their debts and posting much better financial ratios.
At the same time, the balance sheet still carries the consequences of the previous ownership period. The turnaround has started, but the job of further reducing the debt is not yet finished.
The stadium, the sale and the future
Inter’s future now turns on three closely linked issues: the development of the new San Siro, the point at which Oaktree eventually sell their stake and the quality and sustainability of the club’s revenues. The stadium is the clearest opportunity to create added value over the long term.
In September 2025, Milan city council approved the sale of San Siro and the surrounding area to Inter and AC Milan. The two clubs are planning a new 71,500-seat stadium there as part of a wider development project.
The plan centres on a modern stadium designed by Foster + Partners and MANICA. Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan, Banco BPM and BPER Banca are among those involved in the financing.
For Inter, the logic behind wanting a new stadium is simple enough. The club still do not own their stadium and are therefore at a structural disadvantage compared with many top Premier League clubs. The current San Siro is iconic, but its age, the municipal ownership structure and outdated commercial possibilities limit the revenues Inter can generate from it.
As discussed in the earlier part of this Milan mini-series, the stadium has, among other things, the following limitations:
- Limited opportunities for luxury and corporate packages
- A limited number of VIP and corporate seats
- Little scope to link commercial activities and property to the stadium
- Fewer opportunities to make money outside matchdays
- Limited opportunities to generate income from the stadium name
In the modern football world, those factors matter. Football Benchmark’s RevPEPAS metric, revenue per event per available seat, makes the gap clear:
- AC Milan: €40
- Inter: €41
- Juventus (peak in 2018/19): €73
- Real Madrid: €124
- PSG: €137
The issue, then, is not that Inter have too few fans or that the brand lacks recognition. Both Milan clubs regularly draw crowds of more than 70,000. The issue is the infrastructure.
A modern stadium could deliver exactly the sort of stable revenues big professional investors value most: premium seating, corporate packages, stadium naming rights, catering, concerts and other non-matchday events.
That sits within a broader trend in European football. More and more clubs are trying to own their stadium so they are less reliant on unpredictable income from television and sporting performance. Even so, the stadium also brings a dilemma. The project could cost more than €1 billion and would probably need to be financed through a mix of own money and loans.
For a club still working through the debt burden left by the Suning era, that matters hugely. A new stadium could significantly raise the long-term revenue ceiling, but it could also create a fresh debt burden before the old one has been fully paid down.
The new San Siro – three options
Right now, Oaktree effectively have three strategic options. The first is to act as a passive owner. Oaktree could stabilise the finances, refinance the debts, maintain sporting performance and then move relatively quickly to find a buyer.
That does not, however, look especially likely. With that approach, Oaktree would be unable to build an important part of the future stadium value into the club’s value themselves. That would make Inter less attractive to potential buyers and would probably also lower the eventual sale price. In short, value would be left on the table.
The second and probably most logical option is to prepare the stadium project primarily for the future. In that scenario, Oaktree do not necessarily need to fund and complete the stadium themselves. Above all, they need to make sure the project becomes credible and feasible.
That means securing the necessary political approvals, moving the planning on, developing financing options, reducing uncertainty and making sure the stadium project is advanced enough for a future buyer to invest with confidence.
That distinction is crucial. A buyer who takes over Inter with a credible and advanced stadium project already in place is not buying only the current club. He is also buying the future growth in profitability built into that project. Greater certainty around the stadium therefore lifts the club’s value, because future revenues become more predictable and more scalable.
Because of that, the relationship with AC Milan also becomes strategically important. RedBird have a major interest in pushing the project forward because infrastructure is a key part of their investment strategy for Milan.
For RedBird, the stadium is first and foremost a growth engine, a way to sharply increase the club’s recurring revenues. For Oaktree, it is first and foremost a way to raise Inter’s value and make the eventual sale more attractive. Their interests are not exactly the same, but they run closely enough in parallel to make progress together. Both owners need certainty around the infrastructure to unlock the next stage of value growth at their clubs.
For more insight into RedBird’s infrastructure strategy at AC Milan, I refer to my earlier article on RedBird’s approach at AC Milan. The joint approach also makes the project more financially viable.
Inter and Milan can share the costs of construction, infrastructure, financing and operation. That means each club has to commit less money than if they were building separate stadiums.
For Inter, that is especially important because debt from the Suning era still remains. A shared stadium reduces the financial strain that a wholly owned stadium would place on the club’s financial position.
The third option is to become full owner of the new infrastructure themselves. Oaktree could then help fund it and oversee construction through to completion. A project worth more than €1 billion, however, carries major political, construction, financial and execution risk. Italian bureaucracy can also significantly delay the timetable.
For an investor focused on financially distressed companies, and one that usually works to a certain investment period, tying up capital in a project like that for seven to 10 years is probably not ideal. It makes more sense for Oaktree to do what they do best: reduce uncertainty and make sure a future buyer is willing to pay significantly more for Inter.
The stadium strategy should, moreover, be viewed with some nuance. Research into football stadium investment in the Premier League shows that expansions of existing grounds are often followed by better sporting performance in the years that follow.
With completely new stadiums, that relationship is less clear. That does not weaken the financial logic of the project. It simply shows we should not assume a new stadium automatically brings more trophies.
Even so, the broader economic logic remains strong. More stable and recurring stadium revenues increase the financial room a club have to invest in their squad. And because there is a strong long-term relationship in European football between spending levels and sporting success, better infrastructure could in time also increase Inter’s sporting potential, on and off the pitch.
That distinction is also directly relevant to Oaktree’s eventual sale of the club. Seen in that light, the valuation of more than $1 billion mentioned by the Financial Times should probably be viewed more as a floor than a ceiling, particularly if certainty around the stadium keeps growing in the coming years.
Even so, one important caveat remains: the quality of the current profit. The 2024/25 financial year was historic from a financial point of view, but part of the result came from revenues that can swing sharply and may not return every year. Think of income from the World Cup for clubs, the long Champions League run and transfer income.
Giuseppe Marotta himself has indicated that future profitability still depends on Champions League participation and transfer income. Inter’s financial model is clearly far healthier than it was in the Suning era, but the club are not yet fully insulated against sporting setbacks.
A new stadium will not remove that dependency completely, but it can make the revenue base far more stable and diverse. And perhaps that is the most important lesson from Inter’s modern financial history: football clubs may try to force success more quickly with borrowed money, but infrastructure and recurring revenues are what ultimately provide lasting financial resilience.
Conclusion: the price of success
Inter’s profit is real, but financing also made it possible. First, future revenues were sold in 2017, then again in 2022, then refinanced again in 2025. In the end, the creditor even became owner of the club in May 2024.
The lesson is not that football clubs should abandon ambition. Ambition is essential in football. The lesson is that ambition without a financial buffer can become dangerous. When spending rises faster than recurring revenues and future revenues are used to fund today’s success, control slowly shifts away from the club.
Suning delivered sporting success. But the price was structural dependence on external financing. Inter’s trophies and titles were real. So were the debts behind them.
In modern football, the way a club are financed is no longer just a financial choice. Ultimately, the way a club handles money and debt can even determine who owns the club.